Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave , ed.s)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet) )

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Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
( editors Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave , 1970)

Book criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU

'Logic of Investigation ? or Psychology of Research ?'
by Thomas Samuel Kuhn

* Experiments can never be the last element which makes the decision

certain. Problem solving is more accurate and basic.

** Experiments sometimes may be more powerful than problem solving.

* Unless having a common paradigm no problem solving action can occur.

** Every decision action requires a reference.

* Any theory can never be disprooved.

** It's O.K. if at the same time we accept that it can never be

proved, either.

* Psychology of research is more active than logic of investigation.

** O.K. But difference is not much everytime.

* Increasing in knowledge does not mean progress; because it brings

the result of incresing in unknowns.

** Unless these new unknowns are not unsolvable, while increasing

knowledge can provide solution methods then this may be assumed as

progress.

* When making selection between alternative theories, logic alone is

not enough.

** Sometimes it may be true, but not everytime.

'Against Ordinary Science'
by John W. N. Watkins

* Histroy of science has examples that an emprically succesful valid

theory can change place with an uncompromising and more testable.

**

* Most of the time the cause of a scientific crisis is theoric rather

than empiric. This shows that science has independent thoughts more than

Kuhn states.

**

* A new paradigm is never created as Kuhn characterized. Psycological

basics of solution by a genious via dreaming seems weak.

** True.

* He states that it will be more convinient to break the relations

between Kuhn's thesis of uncomprimisation between paradigms, and the

idea of uncompareability which is away from that.

** Not a bad idea !

'Is the Difference Between Normal and Revolutionary Science Valid ?'

by Stephen Toulmin

* There can not be a discrete jumping between matural science and

revolutions, as Kuhn stated.

** O.K.

* Psychology and sociology of research ( source of knowledge ) have

effects in science but to leave the effect of logic of of investigation

in the background is not true.

** O.K.

'Ordinary Science, Scientific Revolutions and History of Science'

by L. Pearce Williams

* Popper and Kuhn supports their ideas from the examples from history.

But we don't have enogh knowledge about history of science, which will

allow a philosophical structure to be built on a base.

** Not wrong !

'Ordinary Science and its Dangers'
by Karl Raimund Popper

* He is not relativist; he believes in absolute and objective truth.

** Are there something like these ?

* Logic of investigation has a few things to learn from psychology of

research, but psycholgy of research has more things.

** Not true !

* Knowledge has no subject.

** Can knowledge exist without a subject which knows it ?

* He states that he was surprised and frustrated with the idea that

psychology and sociology should be used to have clear thoughts.

** He thinks wrong.

* Comparison of different frames in science is always possible.

** O.K.

* Changes of frames are performed in a rational way.

** It may be true most of the time.

* Frames can be changed ( or braked or enlarged ) anytime if it is

tried.

** O.K.

* It's only a dangerous dogma that different frames are untranslate-

able languages.

** It's dogma. Why Kuhn limits the communication problem with wide

scientific frames ? It can be induced up to personal base.

* Science is criticisive; it formed by courageus hypothesis' which

are controlled by criticism. Hence it can be qualified as revolutionary.

** It can be assumed true.

* Science needs a bit of dogmatism, too. It's needed for protection

of science.

** O.K.

* He thinks there are lots of degrees between ordinary and extra-

ordinary scientists.

** O.K.

* The distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary science is not

so much definite as Kuhn stated.

** O.K.

'Falsification and Methodolgy of Scientific Research Programs'

by Imre Lakatos

* Direction of science is determined by imagination not by concepts

which surrounds us.

** Partially true.

* He defends the idea that science is continuous.

** O.K.

* Active observations can disproof theories.

** Why not ?

* He accepts that knowledge has no subject.

** ?

* Criticism is a long duration. It is not easy to eliminate a scien-

tific program with logical or emprical derivations.

** My criteria is workability. Which one seems work better it is

choosen.

* All theories are improbable as much as they are unproveable and as

muc as they are disproveable.

** O.K.

* Certainly accepted scientific theories can not prevent an obser-

vable situation, completely.

** O.K.

* Dogmatism is necessary for protection of current science.

** O.K.

* History of science is the history of competing research programs,

not of those that are serials of ordinary science.

** O.K.

* Some of the most important research programs in histiry of science

are infected to some old programs which are opposite.

** Why not ?

* If a research program causes a progressive problem change then its

successful otherwise it causes a degenerative problem change than it's

unsuccesful. He advises to abondan degenerative problem-shifts since

they are unscientific.

** It seems there are problems in the definition of progressive and

degenerative problem changes. Also in the questions 'what is scientific

and what is not ?'.

* Empricalness and theoretical progress are strictly dependent.

** O.K.

* Falsification is impossible before a better theory exists.

** If falsification is accepted then it can be performed even in the

absence of a better theory.

'Consolations for Supporters of Specialization'
by Paul Feyerabend

* We should keep in mind the truth that science is not the only des-

tination; a world in which science is inactive can be built up.

** To live like animals or plant... It seems impossible as human-

being has mind.

* No theory can be disproved.

** It may be assumed as true.

* What is scientific progress is still unanswered.

** O.K.

* A theory can be disproved by an experiment which is commented in

its terms.

** If the result works why not ?

* He accepts uncompareability of theories.

** I don't agree with him.

* Experiment is a basic part of science but not its primary comment

source.

** Sometimes it may be.

* His definition of science has two components: normal and philo-

sophical. They influences each other. They are synchronous.

** They are inapartable.

* Science is not a serial of temporary ordinary, and increasing pe-

riods, but togetherness of both.

** O.K.

* Incresing: tolerance even against the most silly ideas.

Resistance: Protection against loosing what is in hand, easily.

Influence between them provides progress.

** O.K.

* Popular ideas, eventhough they seems right and perfect, should

allow new thoughts to be created.

** O.K.

'Answers to my Criticisers'
by Thomas Samuel Kuhn

* He states that he prefers the term disciplinary matrix instead

of the term paradigm.

**

* We can not state in confident that two person sees the same

substance.

** O.K.

* When the examples formed by the scientific theory, and the

examples surrounded by the common values which are accepted to make

science are given, person, in the case that something is wrong or in

conflict, does not require any criterion to take a decision.

** Because s/he has eveything to use in decision.

* Different paradigms can not be translated into each other and be

compared.

** I don't agree with him.

* Nobody can begin a discussion about selection of theories, with an

evidence like those in logic or like those in formal mathematics.

** If we deny any proof and disproof at the beginning, in fact we

don't need any evidence.

* Scientific truth is relative.

** O.K.

* He supports specialization in science.

** O.K.

* If revolutions exist than normality should exist.

** But it is not necessary that they are completely apart.

Historical Works on Scientific Thought (Alexandre Koyre)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )

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Historical Works on Scientific Thought (Alexandre Koyre)

Book criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU

Koyre examines the basics of scientific thought. He especially uses

the period between 13th and 14th century. He especially uses Aristo-

tales, Platon, Galilei, Kopernic, Kepler, da Vinci, Ibn-i Sina and

Ibn-i Rusd as his examples.

Main results from his book and my ideas about them are below:

* Science is not necessary for a community to live, for a culture to

develop, for a state ( even for a empire ) to be established.

** Science is the most powerful element in the natural ( ? ) election

of communities. It's a necessity especially in the continuity of a

community's life.

* Historical role of science must not be exaggerated.

** It must not be denied, either. Moreover it will not be much wrong to

exaggerated it from the 20th century on.

* Great bureaucracies are against independent scientific thought.

** O.K.

* In the history of science, failures sometimes are important as much

as successes.

** O.K.

* Perceptions can change by conditions and by time.

** It is a necessity.

* Comments on theories and experiments can change by conditions and by

time.

** It is a necessity, too. Because as long as your background, your

knowledge increase or develop your thoughts will change.

* Theory is more important than experiment. Experimentalism alone does

not provide development.

** Experiments are important as much as theories.

* It's difficult to distinguish scientific and unscientific.

** Unscientific things turns out to be scientific after their casual-

ities begin to be known.

* Convincing is important as much as scientific proof.

** How much you know is not important, whatever you say is bordered

with the knowledge of listeners. So if you cannot make the listeners

convince your scientific proof it may not mean much. But even if you

don't have truths if you can make the listeners to convince your ideas

and if it seems as if it worked. Then it may be more meaningful. And

surely it's more powerful.

* Mathematical explanations of sciences of nature have problems and

disadventages.

** Mathematics is a language. It's language of relations. It's a

shortened way of explanations of relations made by mind. Any branch

of science can not be thought without mathematics; since almost

everything in the universe can be expressed easily by the means of

mathematics. It's necessary for communication. It's very much faster

and usable than natural languages. I don't understand why he is

against mathematics.

* He is against excessive usage of methodology.

** But we cannot abondon methodology completely. Otherwise it may cause

anarchy in science.

The Archeology of Knowledge (Michel Foucault)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )

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The Archeology of Knowledge

( L'archéologie du savoir , 1969)

( Michel Foucault , 1969 )

As I can be able to understand Foucault:

The base of philsophy, sciences and every kind of knowledge is

discursions. In fact, the base is language, but it alone is not enough to

form a strong base. The most important thing is usage of it; that's

discursions which are composed of staments which are composed of sentences

which are tried to be given meanings by composite usage of words, mimics,

gestures, pronounciation etc. (that's by the reflections of Wittgenstein's

form of life in language).

Meanings of discursions are situation-dependent. Situations are

dependent on subjects (owner of discursion), time (present and past),

place (enviroment) etc. Two discursions which are composed of the same

words and same gramatical structure may not have the same meaning. But

at the same time, two different discursions may have the same meaning.

There is no knowledge without a discursive practice; and any discursive

practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms.

Science is localized in a field of knowledge and plays a role in it. A

role that varies according to diferent discursive formations, and is

modified with their mutations.

He prefers archeology in historical analysis of discursions.

In history of science, he says archeological analysis can show

positively how a science functions in the element of knowledge.

He prefers archeology since it is more systematic. Instead he says

he does not defend structialism, the analysis method he chooses is a

structual one. Instead using isoleted units of analysis, archeology, rather

tries to find the relations also between its analytic units (units of its

structures).

Pierre Maurice Marie DUHEM's Philosophy of Science

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )

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Pierre Maurice Marie DUHEM


Survey by Tansu KUCUKONCU

He is a French physicist and philosopher who lived between 1861 and 1916.

His basic thoughts are listed below:

* One could not fully understand a scientific theory or concept without

knowledge of its origins and the development of the problems which it was

designed to solve.

* One of his principal aims is to make a clear theoretical seperation

between physics and metaphysics.

The mataphysician is concerned with explanation, to explain being, 'to

strip reality of appearences covering it like a veil, in order to see the

bare reality itself'. But it's only metaphysics which raises the question

whether there is reality underlying or distinct from sensible appearences.

A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical

propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim at

representing as simply, as completely and as exactly as possible a set of

experimental laws.

* Mathematical deductions have no meaning for a physicist unless they

have physical equivalents.

* 'Agreement with experiments is the sole criterion of truth for a

physical theory'.

A physicist does not conduct physics without some sort of theory.

Physical theory has no objective validity independently of experiment.

* An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena

accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena; this interpretation

substitute for the concrete data really gathered by observation abstract and

symbolic representations which corresponds to them by virtue of the theories

admitted by the observer.

* It would be unreasonable to work for the progress of physical theory

if this theory were not the increasingly better defined and more precise

reflection of a metaphysics; the belief in an order transcending physics is

the sole justification of physical theory.

* A physical theory does not explain the laws, though it coordinates

them systematically. Nor do the laws explain reality; what we know are the

relations between sensible phonomena.

* Every physical theory is an approximate law. Consequently it can not be,

for the strict logician, either true or false; any other law representing

the same experiments with the same approximation may lay as just a claim as

the first to the title of a true law or, to speak more precisely, of an

acceptable law.

* The more perfect the methods of measurements are, the closer is the

approximation and the narrower the limits. But they never become so narrow

that they vanish.

* He argues that the falsification of a theory is necessarily ambigious

and therefore that there is not and cannot be a 'crucial experiment' in F.

Bacon's sense of phrase. For which the physicist can never be sure that there

is not another conceivable hypothesis which would cover the phenomena in

question. (one can never be sure that it is a given theory rather than

auxilary or background hypothesis which experiment has falsified)

But as the number of rescue operations increases, the theory may lost

its simplicity, so it may be more appropriate to chance it with a new one.

* He refuse to admit that there are scientific hypoteses which are beyond

the reach of experimental refutation and must be regarded as definitions

which remain unaffected by emprical testing.

* In an experiment the formula which was useless when we employed one

of the equipments (tools) may become useful when we employ the second.

* He adds indeed that we cannot avoid the feeling that observed relations

correspond to something in things apart from their sensible appearences to

us. But he insists that this is a matter of natural faith or belief and not

something which can be proved in physics.

* Scientific theories permit predictions. Some of this predictions are

emprically testable. If they are verified, the value of the theory is

increased. If a prediction which represents a legitimate conclusion from a

theory is falsified, then that theory must be modified (if not abondened).

If we assume the truth of a given hypothesis and then deduce that on this

assumption a certain event should occur in certain circumstances, the accual

occurance of the event in these circumstances does not prove the truth of the

hypothesis.

* Science advences through the elimination of hypothesis rather than

through verification in a strong sense.

* Science makes progress because experiments constantly causes new

disagreements to break out between laws and facts, and because physicist

constantly touch up and modify laws in order that they may more faithfully

represent facts.

* We can foolow the slow and graduated transformations through which the

theoretical system evolved; but at no time can we see a sudden and arbitrary

creation of new hypotesis.

* His interpretation of physics is 'positivist in its conclusions as well

as in its origins. He rejects metaphysics

* Experimental approaches do not have the power to transform a physical

hypotesis into an indisputable truth; in order to confer this power on it,

it would be necessary to enumerate completely the various hypothesis which

may cover a determinate group phenomena; but the physicist is never sure he

has exhausted all the imaginable assumptions.

Against Method (Paul Karl Feyerabend)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )

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Against Method :
Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge

( Paul Karl Feyerabend , 1975 )

Book criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU

Feyerabend states that 'science is exaggerated'. By most of the people

it's assumed that science is the only way to truths. He is against this

idea. He is complaining about the tightness of the rules of science.

He is trying to support his ideas with examples from the history of

science: Galileo, Aristotales, Kopernik, Newtonian physics, Quantum

physics, medicine in China etc.

I want to give Feyerabend's main ideas in paragraphs below with my

thoughts about them:

* Science may not be the best way of thinking for any time.

** But everytime, it must have higher priority than other ways of

thinking . Because it is examined and accepted by the authorities, at

least for the period up to that time.

* Science must not have certain tight rules and methods. Anything must

not border science.

** Without some rules and methods you cannot protect the science. Other-

wise you can lost everything. Having working truths may become impossible.

* Science must be open to new ideas.

** But not more than enough. New ideas must fight against the old ones.

This is necessary for protection of science aginst degeneration.

* Theories which seems unsuccesfull must not be thrown away. Consist-

ency rule is a barrier for development. Consensus is another barrier.

** If new theory works well, there is not much need to deal with the

old one. Consistency is needed for protection. Sometimes it may cause

slow progress. But most of the time it prevents regression. In the ab-

sence of consensus-especially n strategical subjects-then a great chaos

occurs. Everything becomes like an arap's hair.

* Science may be able to use out-of-science objects.

** But, after bringing acceptable explanations. Because usage of unex-

plained things carries more risc than usage of explained things.

* Science must not turn out to be an ideology.

** O.K.

* Usage of approximations in science is poorness.

** No problem if everything goes well with approximations. Science,

especially applied science; that's engineering, does not need pure

certainty.

* Science must be independent.

** Sure. But it seems impossible. Because science needs money. So, who

have money can canalize science easily.

* Science must be democratic. Acception of new theories must be per-

formed by the participation of all the people.

** Its democracy must be limited. Acception must be performed between

the people who knows the subject well.

* Science education must be objective; the teaching material must not

be bordered by the theories which are in use.

** Time is not enough for doing everything. Knowledge of accepted

truths is a must for development.

* He defends the idea of being against methods and supports anarchy in

science.

** Isn't cause of anarchy searching for better methods ? Else, what is

its pro ?

* He is against the authority of mind evem in science.

** Then what will be our reference? How can we define our truths? What

can I trust when deciding? If my mind is not an authority for me. It's

impossible that someone else's can be. How can I trust the ideas of a man

who does not trust the authority of his mind for himself.

What is the definition of mind? Mind is not static. Rules of mind can

change.

* A last thing about this book. Feyerabend dislikes ad hocs. But when

telling the example of Galileo he is contradicting to himself; he supports

Galileo since he behaved against the methods. But Galileo uses ad hocs...