Friday, July 20, 2007

Technology and Alienation in the Thought of Karl Marx

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )

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Technology and Alienation in the Thought of Karl Marx

A Survey by Tansu KUCUKONCU


Nowadays besides lots of troubles, I think alienation is one of the important problems which is brought into human life by technology (which is extending in a very speedy way).

Every day, technology solves new problems. But unfortunately it makes this most of the time by creating new problems. Most of the problems we have today did not exist i.e 20 years ago. Every passing day this turns out to be a more complex situation. Every solution makes the definition of human being needs to be revised. Is any human being living today more human than any human being lived i.e 50 years ago. I think it really is a difficult question to answer. I think some logical answers can be found in researches about alianation problem of human beings (both to itself and to nature).

In this paper I will try to examine and try to find feasaible answers to alienation problem of human being from the viewpoint of grand-master Marx.

We can define 'alienation' easly, in a paradoxial way, as 'situation of being alien'. But before using alien-rooted words and terminology, it should be better to define 'what 'normal' (that's, the man's essence for our case) is, or should be'. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand what 'alienation of man' can mean, if we don't know what man has become alienated (or enstranged) from. (1)

The mature Marx held man's essence involves the foundation and basis of man's survival and basic factors behind the development of mankind. Therefore it is not anabstract inherent in an individual person but a reflection of the supra-individual definition of a new charecter engendered when individuals combine to form themselves into society.

The bearer of man's essence, the main body of the history of mankind , is none other than the 'individuals existing among mutual relations'. Such individuals are not only the creators of the world of material wealth but alsocreators of themselves and their mutual relations.(1,79)

He remarked that productive forces and social relationsare two different aspects of the development of individuals in society. (1)

In the view of mature Marx, man's essence has two levels.

1. Antropologic essence: which takes material need as its natural prerequsite and shapes up and develops through labor, that the ability for practice, a practical force that shapes up and plays its role through activities.

Sometimes Marx called this as 'man's innate essence' or 'man's natural instincts in general'.

Labor is the basic determinant of this essence and sociality and ideology are derivative determinants. This are at primary level. From such determinants at the primary level a series of determinants at the secondary level, such as ethics, freedom, and aesthetic feeling, are derived. (1,80)

As Marx saw it, the antropological essence is only at the secondary level of man's essence, namely, the natural prerequisite for man's real essence.

2. As far as the real essence is concerned, that which is far more important than its natural prerequisite is its actual basis. This means the living conditions under which man moves about to bring into play his ability and creates a force able to control nature and society; in other words, it means the 'the sum of total productive forces, funds, and the form of social communications which every individual and every generation take over as things that are prepared for them. Man's real essence is determined mainly by the living conditions of the society, especially the mode of production. This is the viewpoint of historical materialism. (1,81)

It is the basic concept of the mature Marx that living conditions such as productive forces and social forms essential to individual activities are themselves the 'products of man's activities'; they are 'the results ofman's ability to practice' and 'the wealth of man's natural instincts' -in other words, things created by man through the role of his essence. Marx also held that in the life of the society only the products of and results of man's activities can become the social premise that decides man's social activities. This is a dialectical point of view.

All forces, wealth, relations, and the system of human society are the products of man's activities of practice, the objectivization of man's essence. In the life of society there is no necessity or a mysterious, fatalist force that bears relation to man's activity.

The conditions of living are the products of labor and history. They continuosly change and develop, and so does the real essence of man, which is not a fixed, determined value. The development of labor that determines the conditions of living is also a process of ever growing socialization of labor, whose concrete expression is the progress of division of labor. 'The different stages of the progress of division of labor are also the different forms of ownership'. Thus 'man's essence' is transformed from the abstract, antropologic determinant into the concrete area of social economy and becomes a vital concept in grasping historical development in its totality. The progress of history is thus the progress of man, the progress of man's essence. (1,82)(3)

Human being is to be defined in terms of a relationship to a setting which is at the same time an activity. Human being begins and continues as a project of seeking to fill basic life needs by engaging actively with an environment to produce the things which meet those needs; and this active engagement, presupposing as it does for Marx that the basic relationship to the setting is one of oppposition, is seen as an enterprise of achieving mastery over that setting, that is, over the world of nature. To be more precise, the engagement is an action of making, an action of production, an action by which the portions of the setting are made into objects suitable to the satisfaction of human needs.

For the present purpose (that's trying to express the relations between tecnology and alienation) of outlining the place of technology in studies of Marx, however, what has to be emphasized is

1. that with the filling of needs by acts of making new needs are created. 2. that filling needs by acts of making in the first place is itself the elemental techical performance, and

3. that this action of filling by making things is the action that begins human being as such.

As Marx says, 'the first historical (properly human) act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. (3,xi)

In fact that filling needs, thereby creating new needs, through an action of making is the performance that institutes the human species as human, that is, having its own proper sphere of activity with its own charecteristics, among them that of being a history, three important points have to be emphasized.

First of all, technology has its roots in the very constitution of mankind as such.

Second, that same constitution contains a relationship of opposition/mastery with respect to the world of nature; so that to establish and maintain himself as human being the human species has constantly to impose species-suitable charecteristics upon item in and from its environment -that is, in order to achieve its own humanness, human being must transform nature into nature-for-man. But one must not to fail to include a

third point here, namely, in asmuch as making things to feel needs creates new needs, which in being filled by further making lead to still more new needs, the project of human self-achievement through engagement with nature to transform it into a human world is a progressively expanding process whose dimensions are limited only by limitations that might lie within the capabilities of human activity.

- Here, we face with the question of 'where to stop ?'. I think that the roots of man's alienation lies in this question. In the craziness of acting (making, doing, etc.) for trying to live, he, in fact, is not aware of this question.

The very activity that wins man his humanness, the very action of making that gives him the means to fill his needs, that gives him the instrumental objects whereby to impart a form to things that makes them appropriate to him, this very activity which should be his self-achievement is disrupted from the very first and leads instead to self-negation. Here we have the Marxian concept of alienation. (3)

Techne -a making that produces something, art, skill, method. Techno-logy in a strict sense, then, means an articulate thinking (logos) turned toward production andmaking (techne) so as to probe their meaning in an appropriate, radical, and comprehensive way. Technology is the thinking of technique, while tecnique is the productive transformation of being. (3,xv)

There is another way, however, in which it is used technology (la technologic) so as to require us to distinguish it clearly from technique (la technique). Technique, that is, any operation of making, has been with mankind from its beginnings. Technique has come actually to posses almost an absolute creative power, to undertake the transformation of all being, to be inherently unrestrained by limits of any sort from any source, and to promote a universally integrated and similar plan, purpose, and set of methods and means in a single hole of historical movement. In short, what we today call technology is simple technique nowseen finally in full possession of the role it plays within the perspective of historical development credited to Marx, a role that while placing it in basic continuity with the past also makes it unlike technique in the past. In a word, technology is techniqued as total and universal. (3,xvi)

Technology, science of technique, on the one hand, it is a pactice conditioned and promoted by a 'logos' of a specific sort, that is by explicitly theoretical insights in the form of rational science, on the other hand, it is a practice, a 'techne', that conditions and promotes that same science. Technique becomes technology because it fuses with science in an intimate mutual engendering and conditioning.

For Axelos this is a logos of abstraction -and power-minded scientific reason (Marx would say of alienating and alienated reason) which corresponds exactly to and fuses with the performance of making that, as themselves dehumanized power-minded operations, compose that industrial system we call in more offhand fashion 'modern technology'.

Technology, being a practical achiever precisely on the scale of the concepts in theoretical science, because the two now form a single thing, is the concrete power not only capable of but actually on the way to achieving a transformation of the work and human beings every where and in all respects.

Alienation is abreak of the entire process away from what it is supposed to be, namely the actualization of humanity through the making and use of the means for filling needs.

Tecnique in the modern world, technology, finally has the actual capability of being all-inclusive, of involving the totality of human beings and of transforming the totality of the natural world. (2) (4.a) (8)

Alienation is for Hegel another term for 'growing-up', a process of progressive and alternating self-differentiation and self-identification, or relating to others in order to become what one is, and of distinguishing oneself from others in order to be what one is, and of distinguishing oneselffrom others in order to be what one is -and in order to relate. (2,42)

Feurebach:

'Man has a constant tendency to project outside himself qualities which belong properly to human nature but which man idealizes and places in a God, who thus becomes all man looked for but did not find in himself.

Religion is the very essence of alienation; it is man's refusal to become all his capable of being, his unwillingness to find the perfection of human being in human being, relinguishing that responsibility in favor of submission of an alien God, who is the idealization of those qualities which in their essence are properly human.

The concept of alienation, then, has changed from the becoming-other which is essential to a developmental process; it has become a degradation of man from what he truely is or should be. (3,48)

Marx's alienations' roots are economic; its ramifications are political and religious; and it constitutes what human 'praxis' must overcome, if man is to become what he truely is.

Common points of

Marx-Hegel: their systems are dialectic, and

Marx-Feurebach: they emphasize on negative significance.

Marx adopted Feurebach's viewpoint, holding that religion was a form of alienation. Under Feurebach's influence, he broke with Hegel's idealism and turned toward materialism.

In Marx's view Feurebach's work was important, but it had not been carried through the end; the criticism of religion was only the first step, and there were many thingsto be done after taking it.

Marx points out that Feurebach's starting point is religious 'self-alienation', due to which the world is duplicated into heavenly, imaginary world and earthly, real one.

Feurebach discovered the antithesis of the heavenly and earthly worlds, while Marx proceeded to show that the latter contained within itself the antithesis of state and society.

The term 'alienation' occurs only in the writings of the young Marx, however, the concept expressed by this termremians a constant in his thought to the very end of hisendeavors. (7.a)

Alienation can be defined according to six different attitudunal states:

1. powerlessness

2. meaninglessness

3. normlessness

4. cultural enstrangement

5. self-enstrangement

6. social isolation (7.a,67) (4.a) (8)

To be human is to be something more than merely a being of nature. Man distinguishes himself from beasts, says Marx, by the fact that he produces the satisfaction of his own needs. Man can produce for himself what is not yet given. What is the distinctive of man, then, is productive activity. (4.a,17)

If production, of course, is to be more than haphazard and minimal it requires planning, and planning requires thought (intelligence); if it is to satisfy the increasing needs which emerge as the result of its own functioning this productive activity more than individual, it must be cooperative, social, and this requires communication through language; if producing the satisfaction of increasing social needs is to be economically feasible, not every man produce everything, and this requires a division of labor. Thus, in his development man distinguishes himself more and more from the beast; he distinguishes himself by thought, by language, by social living, by specialization of activities. All these are subsequent to and grounded in the one distinguishing charecteristic -productive activity. It might be objected that there are many distinctively human activities -artistic, literary, recreational- which are in no sense of the word productive. To this Marx would reply that all human activity is neither contributory to or derivative from the productive forces. Whatever significance other activity has inseperable from this relationship. (4.a,19)

Through this productive activity, by transforming nature he distinguishes himself not only from the beast but also from what he was originally was. Productivity, however, is truely human, and man is truely himself, only to the extent that through the activity whereby he transforms nature he continues to create himself. But this he cannot do, if either the activity of producing or the product of the activity belongs to another than himself.

Marx means by the most fundamental form of alienation, the alienation of labor.

If more than one kind of work enters into the productive scheme, as indeed must be the case, quite obviously one kind of work will be valued more highly than another.

Some will do mental work and others will do manual work. And those who do mental work will enjoy a double advantage:

1. there will be fewer of them, and thus as individuals they will be more in demand

2. their position in the productive will be such that the manula workers will be dependent on them for the very significance of what the latter do. (8,106)

We can say that those who own the means of production amass the larger share of produced value in the form of profits. As profits accumulate, however, they are not permitted to lie idle; eventually they turn into capital, which is qualitatively different from either mere profits or mere wealth in that it takes on the charecter of an independent force, which in a very real sense is controlled by no one; instead it becomes the driving force which controls the productive process.

Capital has laws of its own to which persons engaged in the process must simply submit.

In the religious form of alienation: it is involved man's projection of his own human ideals into a being outside himself, to whom he then became subsurvient.

In the economist form of alienation man has by his own activity produced a monster called capital, to which he is not only subservient but literally enslaved. (8,110)

By unconsciously following out the logic of the productive process, man has engendered a multiple alienation which now crushes him. (1) (2) (4.a) (6.a) (8)

There are basically four kinds of alienation in our sense (which can directly be related to technology).

1. Alienation from the product of work.

Alienation in this sense is the condition of both 'loss' and 'servitude'. It is not man who dominate nature, who shapes it according to his own needs, but raher a nature or technology of man's own making which comes to dominate him as an alien, autonomous force.

2. Alienation from the act of producing, from 'labor as life-activity'.

This is the essential aspect of self-alienation.

3. Alienation from the 'species-being' (from man's essence).

Man is alienated from the product of his own work and activity is no longer able to experience himself as a human being.

Marx:'Alienated labor 'alienates from man his own body' as well as 'external nature, his mental life and his human life'. It produces man as a 'mentally and physically dehumanized being'.

4. Alienation from the fellow man (that's, man from man) (1,83)

He considers the various kinds of alienation involved to be interrelated, sometimes conceptually and sometimes factually.

In the view of mature Marx, the alienation of labor is 'seperation of the laborer from the objective conditions of labor'. that is 'the tramendous material power' created by the workers 'does not belong to the workers but to the personified condition of labor, namely, the capital', and it stands opposed to the workers as an alienated ruling power.

Marx mentioned 'the alienation of the content of the labor from the worker' and the relationship between a worker and his own labor has become one between himself and property of others'. But he pointed out even more profoundly that live labor, the life expression of a laborer, manifest itself as an alien matter opposed to the laborer, because the laborer has sold it to capital in exchange of means ofsubsistence. As the process of labor is the process during which the ability to do labor is being brought into play or the process in which the essence is being objectivized, products are nothing but the results of labor or the objectivized essence.

What the alienation of products and of activity entails is in fact the alienation of of man's essence.

It determines the alienation of of activity, and the alienation of man from man is nothing but its personification. (8,112)

In the situation which productive work has brought about, man's work has ceased to be that which charecterizes him as man and has become a commodity which is bought and sold in the market place. This means that man has accomplished another, deeper alienation -he has alienated himself, for, as his work becomes a commodity, so does he become a commodity, thus alienating his very dignity as man-he no longer belongs to himself.

The work which charecterizes him and is his dignity has become simply a means to an end, that of producing wealth -for another- worse still, of producing money, whose quality is its quantity. Thus man has turned his work into an alien force; he has lost his interest in his work and is interested only in his 'job', i.e. what his work will produce for him in the form of money.

By the same token, man has alienated himself from the product of his work, not only in the sense that he has no control over it -it simply flows into the system- but also in the sense that, given modern techniques of production, he may never even see it; it simply 'stands opposed to him as an autonomous power'.

Finally, within the society there occurs an alienation of men from each other. As Marx sees it, the very fact that a man works, produces, not for himself but for another, means that the productive forces results in an antogonism between those who work and those whom they work, between those who produce the capital and those who own capital. What began simply as division of labor has become a division of classes, and the one class is alienated from the other. This sort of split can be recognized within a paricular society, says Marx, but it becomes more acute and more irreconsilable in proportion as society itself becomes more universal, and a universal antogonism arises between all those who have only their work to sell and those who alone have the means of purchase that work. (4.a)

Precisely because capital has grown into an independent force governed by its own laws and progressively less and less subject to control by human persons, the capitalist himself is governed by the laws which govern capital, most basic of which is that it must increase. He, then, is constrained to increase it. thus, the capitalist is alienated in the overall depersonalization which capital engenders; like the worker he is not the master of his own destiny. (4.a,21)

The very reason behind Marx's lifework was not merely to show the inevitablity of alienation, if things are allowed to continue in the direction they are going, a point which political economists either missed or deliberately covered over, but also to show that man can consciously take matters into his own hands by reappropriating what capital had expropriated and returning himself to himself. (1) (4.a) (4.b) (6.b) (6.c) (8)

Alienation, as Marx indicated, is a historical process of seperation during which the conditions of labor are being transformed into capital and labor into hired labor. The actual action of alienation is the process of exploitation during which production is being transformed into social production in the form of alienation. And Marx added that the different forms of surplus value and the various patterns of capitalist production are all expressions of alienation. For example, capital is an alienated social power, an alienated form of labor. As a material condition of labor itself, it is a 'force that is alienated from labor but controls labor'. For another example, hired labor is labor alienated from labor itself. The wealth it creates stands opposed to itself as the wealth of other people. 'Its the process of getting rich stands opposed to itself as a process of its own pauperizetion, and its social strength stands opposed to itself as a social force that dominates it'.

The capitalist mode of production, as Marx saw it, is but 'a form of alienation represented by capital and conceived in the mutual relationship of different factors of social labor. (3)(7.b)

What allows man to posit himself as man and oppose himself to Nature, in order to wrest from Nature his goods, is the tool.

Need determines the instrument that leads to the satisfaction of the need, and the available needs of production engender (produce) new needs.

The natural and social realtionship of man with (historicized) Nature is a relationship of struggle, and the natural history of man is a product of this struggle.

As long as men used mostly natural instruments of production, water, for example, they remanined subject to nature, whereas the means of production that civilization creates (and that thereupon re-create it as a technicist civilization) help men to oppose nature more effectively. But, while exploiting nature, men have let themselves be exploited by other men; and they remain, thus, subordinated to what they have themselves produced. The development of the instruments of production leads necessarily to the creation and development of the machine, for the labor that presupposes the machine will show itself to be the one most suitable for development.

The machine is in a certain way the synthesis of all instruments. It contains them in that it makes synthetically. Yet man has continued to be alienated progressively in and by his labor. The age of the machine completes this alienation, and man, having himself produced the machine, now finds himself to be a mere cog in the immense machine and machinery of capitalism. (3,79)

While necessity to the development of human societies, the machine nevertheless crushes men; yet it crushes them not simply as the machine but by the way of the relationships that the workers have with it.

These inhuman relationships that bind men to the machine make the essence of man mechanical. Today, Marx observes, the machine adopts itself to man's weakness in order to make weak man into a machine. Man thus become a slave to the machine, just as he is likewise a slave of divided labor, private property, capital, money, industry, and the whole of technicist civilization. The constant progress of thedivision of labor and the continual simplification of machine and the mechanical labor transform the child into a worker and the worker into a child. The development of productive forces, leading to the reign of capitalist machines, has not brought the worker to the maturity but to infantilism and debilitation.

Since real productive forces, in satisfying the material needs of men and in endlessly creating new ones, are the internal motor of historical development, it is their rhythm that determines the rhythm of the development of society as a whole. Any disruption of the rhythm of functioning of these forces, especially on the complex level of general mechanization, becomes a generalized social disruption.

The history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man's essential powers, to exposure to the senses of humen psychology.

Industry is the most complete form of labor. This enormous productive machinery allows man to set himself up in effective, victorious opposition to nature.The crucial seperation of town and country gave rise to the seperation of production from trade, which in turn fostered the development of manufacturing. The spread of commerce, navigation, and manufacturing speeded the accumulation of moveable capital and gave birth to big industry. It was big industry that completed the victory of the town over the contry, that generated a mass of productive forces, that generalized competition, that established the means of communication and the world market, that gained control of commerce, and that transformed all capital into industrial capital and led to the development of the financial system and the centralization of capital. This mother-goddess of the modern world 'destroyed as far as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and where it could not do this, made them into a palpable lie.

Mechanization, industrialization, and the technicism; all these conquests have as well intensified and extended the drama of alienation, pushing the external charecter of man's practical activity and the externalization of his being to their ultimate consequences. Everything seems to have become strange, alien, hostile, and alienating, at the very moment when industry transforms history into universal history.

Technicist civilization has made life and labor unbearable. It has reduced the play of human activity to the role of the worker free to sell his labor force to those who possesses the instruments of production as private property; it has heightened as far as can be done the contradiction between productive forces and the forms of the organization of labor and property; it has consequently made broader and broader the base of social life while making narrower and narrower the closed circle of those who determine the relations of production. In doing this, technicist civilization is an impediment to the full and harmonious development of productive forces, stifling at once industrial workers and the true creative, social possibilities of industry itself.

Men no longer enjoy the products of their labor, since the worker receives anly what is indispensible for him to perpetuate his physical life and and continue to sell his labor force. Those who hold the means of production throw outthe products as so much bait to draw the money of others, creating and awekening needs and desires, too often artificial, in order thereafter to satisfy them. Real needs are far from being really satisfied, while a crowd of artificial needs id artificially produced and artificially satisfied. ' This alienaiton manifest itself in part in that it produces sophistication of needs and of their needs and of their means on the one hand, and a bastial barbarization, a complete, unrefined, abstract simplicity of need, on the other'.

Industrial, technicist civilization thus develops in the heart of a crude barbarism in need and labor: labor is exploited more than ever before, and needs, offeredsatisfaction that is but gross and artificial, remain unsatisfied.

Bourgeois, capitalist civilization, consequently, dissimulates to men all the nature wealth of the material world, mechanizeses needs and the productive means for satisfying needs, and substitutes for the natural, social, real human world an artificial, alienating world technified to the extreme, alien and hostile to those who live in it and have built it.

Capitalist technicism poisons and alienates everything, and only the negativity that is implicated in its very essence will be able to furnish the antidote that can reconcile men with a social and human civilization and technique. (3,84)

Once technicist alienation is overcome, technique will be able to develop in a manner that is integral andnonalienating if it is kept under the control of the whole of the human community. The comprehensive planning of technicalproduction should prevent it from generating alienation and disorder. (3,85)

Capitalist society, by generalizing labor and positing the basis for integral technological development, has brought about the preparetion of what will abolish it.

- Here, Marx's expectations (assumtions) didn't occur. He thought that capitailist system would be its own grave-digger. He expected that communist movements would begin in developed (that's technologically; that's, highly industrialized) capitalist countries as a movemenet of industrial laborers (which have class conscious, etc.). But it begun in different conditions in an unindustrialized country and as a movement of peasants.

It has universalized labor, making it maximally alienating, and set up the practical realty of abstract labor operating in a total indifferencce. Technicist labor is present no longer under a particular form but imposes itself on everyone in the universality of its abstraction; it no longer is intimately bound to the individual.

The extreme mechanization and automatization of labor, the transformation of every reality and process into components of an industrialized mechanism, the abstract of automated technicism that has been developed to the utmost by the most modern societies and invades the technically underdeveloped countries, all this moves in the direction of its own negation. This state of affairs -the transformation of all men into workers free to sell their labor force and the development of a total indifference toward the mode of labor- can and must lead to the freeing of all workers, to the superseding of both traditional and modern labor. (3)(8)

Philosophy is nothing other than religion (the 'table of contents of the theoretical struggles of mankind') rendered into thought and developed by thought. Philosophy, that is, metaphysics, continues, crowns, and systematizes all ideological alienation: 'The philosophic mind is nothing but the 'alienated' mind of the world thinking within its 'self-alienation'. Abstract, metaphysical thought stands opposed to concrete, sensuous reality. (3,104)

The act of the externalization of thought, nonetheless, continues to express the real externalization of alienated human activity, without recognizing it. Alienated thought, since it is in no way a truely operative instrument, only further alienates human practice through failure to consider it in all its true reality.

The world of thought is alienated and alienating because it is only the ideological half of the real world, which is itself actually and materially alienated. Whether it work by way of intiution orreason, philosophic thought fight against the tree of reality on which itself has grown only in order to leave it behind.

The man 'alienated' from himself is also the thinker 'alienated' from his essence -that is, from the natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore fixed mental shapes or ghosts dwelling outside nature and man. Philosophic thought is thus condemned as having mysticism and religion for its source, as metaphysical, as nonhuman and inhuman.

Since historical becoming has only been a progressive development of alienation and since what men do amounts only at their self-externalization in practical, social labor, it is clear that the theoretical grasp -be it empricist or rationalist, materialistic or spiritualistic- of this process was and remained ideological, that is, alienated philosophically.

Marx's materialism is practical, and in the name of this 'materialism' he condemnes all philosophy as speculative.

Labor, the family, politics, law. morality, self-consciousness, art, religion, philosophy, and science, all that which brought the being-in-becoming of totality to the light of logos, the concept, and the idea, and, finally, to the light of absolute knowledge, all this is regarded by Marx as constituting so many forms and forces of the externalization and alienation of human being. In the phenomena that spirit grasps, Marx discovers the real alienations of man.

It is not philosophic thought or the thinker who can lead mankind to universal reconciliation, although reflective grasp plays a large role in Marx's thinking.

Marx:

'Th philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it'. (3,107)(2)(4.a)(7.a)(8)

'The worker can regain mastery over collective and socialized production only by assuming the scientific, design, and operational prerogatives of modern engineering; short of this, there is no mystery over the labor process. The extension of the time of education which modern capitalism has brought about for its own reasons provides the framework ... Such education can engage the interest and attention of workers only when they become masters of industry in the true sense, which is to say when the antogonisms in the labor process between controllers and workers, conception and execution, mental and manual laborare overthrown, and when the labor process is united in the collective body which conducts it'.

When the fashionable concept of alienation is at last returned to the working class, their task of control over the labor will demand:

1. the abolition of wage labor, property relations and the bourgeoise; and

2. the abolition of the current capitalist division of labor and the petty bourgeoisie, including the philosophers and technicians of alienation who perpetuate class relations under the cover of humanism and technical neutrality. Marx:

'If man is to be disalienated, it is not enough to analyze the state he is in; it is necessary to go further and translate thought into action -better still, to recognize that thought divorced from action is not truely thought'.

The entire world has become divided into two antogonistic classes, the bourgeoise and the proleteriat, and the former following out the logic of its own mode of production has engendered not only the capitalist system butalso the socio-economic class which is destined to bring out its demise and put and end to alienation.

As in other exploited classes, the proleteriat's members will manifest themselves as the 'grave-diggers' of the bourgeoisie -but they will do so consciously. It is for this reason that the inculcation of 'class consciousness' isso important. It is for this reason, too, that Marx must makemen conscious both of their alienation in society and of the need to eliminate those bulwarks of capitalist alienation -private property, the state, and religion.

The process has reached such a point that class opposition has become totally universalized: the whole of human society is composed of only two antogonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proleteriat (abstractly put, capital and power). As a result, the elimination of one of these classes by the other will mean the complete elimination of classes, since classes exist only in opposition to each other and by virtue of their competing interests.

The society which is being ushered in, then, is theclassless society, in which, since there will be no classes, there will be no class interests, and the only interest left will be the intersts of man as such. Man, then, will be truely disalienated, and alienation in all its forms will be at end. Because man has reappropriated what the system had expropriated he will regain his alienated self. Quite obviously this reappropriation will not be individual -men cannot as individuals regain the ownership of a product which is social- it will be collective.

I thought that when making his analysis Marx has skipped some important points. One of these is ethnic problems; situation of minorities in societies.

Another one is unemployment problem. Are underemployed men more alienanated from unemployed (real ones !) men ? A difficult question to answer. I think the probability of its countraverse is higher.

These brings differents aspects to human vs technology relations and to alienation problem.

In a classless society, in which alianetion is overcome, in which sharing (of wealth) is done equally (that's, with social justice), what will the source of motivation for labor in society be ? (That's what will motivate people to work ?) Because there will always be nicer and easier works. And people will prefer these ones rather than worse, and more difficult ones.

.. May be with laws !... But I think there will always be much difficulties.

Division of labor seems as if it always will create problems. I think its unique antidote, in today's conditions, without going back to past's conditions, can be robots (and/or completely automated machines; which can perform very boring and monotonous works for men to be able to live in a lower lever of alienation) if they were used in a good sense.

Marx defines man's essence, but he leaves this definition somewhat open to historical developments's modifications. This brings some problems with itself, too. Priority is of supplying basic needs (just to live) of all the people. But even after performing this how will we control the increasing of man's needs ? How will we make the distinction of alienation and disalienation, then ?

It is not forgotten that man has psylogical needs, too. Human's needs are not limited just with physical ones. But satisfaction of these should be stopped when they begin to give harm to others. Avaricousness, covetousness, etc.; aren't these instincts which lies in the basics of every bad habits, icluding 'private ovnership ?

In today's conditions, it seems almost impossible to classify people strictly in just two categories, as bourgeoise and proleteriat.

Another problem is with 'private ownership': it seems it is not easy and even true to eliminate it completely. But to define its limits, and rules, by saving social justice, seems rather logical; especially of means (that's, tools or macnines) of production.

It seems that Marx also skipped the problem of planning of population. It is an important point which has also a strong effect in increasing of labor, and hence increasing of division of labor.

Technology (in fact, even it is used as a measure of modernity, and contemprorary civilization), besides it brings solutions to satisfaction of man's basic (plus extra...) needs, it also brings solutions (and methods) to how to annihilate more people in an easier and quicker way !!! Hence it causes the highest levels of barbarianism to appear.

(i) i: source material's no. in the Bibliography (i,j)

i: .. .. .. .. .. ..

j: pg. no.

1. A Brief Discussion of Marx's Theory of Alienation, by Cao Tianyu, Chinese Studies in Philosophy, Fall '84, pg. 78..89

2. On the Concept of 'Alienation' -from Hegel to Marx, by Wang Ruoshui, Chinese Studies in Philosophy, Spring '85, pg. 39..70

3. Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx, by Kostas Axelos, (Translated into Engllish by Roland Bruzina)

4. Alienation: Plight of Modern Man, edited by William C. Bier,

a. Alienation: Marxist Social Category, by Quentin Lauer (pg. 10..29)

b. Alienation Among Minority Groups, by Madeline H. Engel (pg. 94..112),

5. Technology and Alienation, by Abraham Rotstein, Ultimate Reality and Meaning, March '86

6. Theories of Alienation: Critical Perspectives in Philosophy and the Social Sciences, edited by R. Felix Geyer and David R. Schweitzer, Leiden: Nijhoff Social Sciences Division '76

a. Alienation as a Concept in the Social Sciences, by Peter C. Ludz

b. Alienation and Reification, by Joachim Israel,

c. Using Marx's Theory of Alienation Emprically, by Peter Archibald

7. Alienation: Problems of Meaning, Theory and Method, edited by R. Felix Geyer and David Schweitzer, Routledge & Kegan Paul '81

a. Class Determination in Marxist and Empricist Concepts of Alienation, by John Horton and Manuel Moreno, pg. 61..77

8. Marx's Theory of Alienation by Itsvan Meszaros, The Merlin Press, '72

PERCEPTION, THEORY and COMMITMENT (Harold I. BROWN)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )
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PERCEPTION, THEORY and COMMITMENT
The New Philosophy of Science
( Harold I. BROWN , 1977 )

Book review and criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU

Two central problems of theory of knowledge: problems of meaning and of truth.

The empricist approach to these problems received its classical form in the work of D. Hume.

All the perceptions of the mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which he called IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS.

Impressions are the immediate objects of awareness that weexperience when we perceive or introspect. Ideas are the objects we are aware of in all mental activities other than perception and introspection.

Ideas:

1.simple : copies of impressions which remain in the mind

2.complex: ideas that the imagination creates by combining simple ideas

The basic unit of meaning, for Hume, is the term. And a term is meaningful only if there is an idea which corresponds to it. An individual can learn a term the meaning of a term only if he has experinced the impressions necessary for the formation of the corresponding idea. And any term which is supposed to refer to an object beyond the limits of possible experince is a mere meaningless term or sound. The range of meningful language ids limited to the range of possible experince.

Meaningful propositions:

1.relations of ideas

2.matters of fact

The only world that can be known is the world of impressions and every impression is ontologically distinst from every other impression.

This causes some problems. Suppose that observed that a particular set of impressions always occur together. But it can not be quarateed that those will occur together in the future. This make it difficult to make universal propositions.

Historically, one o fthe most important objections to empricism has come from the philosophy of mathematics. It's not experince that we have come to know that 2+3=5, etc.

That all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles. (Whitehead and Russell)

Propositions:

1.elementary (atomic): either true or false

2.molecular: constructed out of elemantary propositions by means ofoperators.

The essential property of implication for the mathematician and philosopher of mathematics is that anything implied by a true proposition must be true.

Logicism maintains that mathematics is logic and thus that mathematics is true in just those ways in which logic is true. This does not solve the problem of the nature of mathematical truth, but only transforms it into the problem of the nature of logical truth.

Truth tables (Wittgenstein):

1.true for some values of argument and false for the others

2.false .. .. .. .. .. .. true .. .. ..

3.true .. all values of the arguments (tautology)

Hilbert's formalism:

Logicist holds that pure mathematics and logic are true. Formalist .. .. they are neither true nor false, being merely rule-governed games with symbols.

All arguments must consist of the manipulation of symbols inaccordance with precise rules.

Positivism: a form of strict empricism. The positivist maintains that only those knowledge claims which are founded directly on experience are genuine.

Modern logical positivism: For the logical positivist there are two forms of research which yield knowledge: emprical research, which is the task of the various sciences, and logical analysis of science, which is the task of philosophy.

The central doctrine of logical positivism is the verificationtheory of meaning, the thesis that a contingent proposition ismeaningful if and only if it can be emprically verified.

For Hume: the basic elements of experince are impressions

For Wittgenstein: the basic units of experience are facts: not just qualities such as 'red', but rather 'that there is red at a given time and place.

Purported propositions:

1.formal propositions, tautologies and contradictions

2.atomic

3.molecular

4.pseudo: mere meaningless combinations of sounds or signs without cognitive content.

First three of are them are meaningful and their truth values can be determined by means of observation and logic.

It can be understood as a more moderate version of logical positivism.

The central difficulty for logical positivism as a philosophy of science is that scientific laws which are formulated as universal propsositions cannot be conclusively vreified by any finite set of observation statements.

Carnap proposed replacing the notion of verification with the notion of a 'gradually increasing confirmation', and takes rthe notion of an 'observable predicate' as fundamental,defining 'confirmable sentence' in terms of this notion.

Two of the central problems of logical empricist philosophy of science:

1.analysis of the confirmation relation that is to hold between a scientific law and the observation statements which confirm ordisconfirm it, and the analysis of how scientific terms get their meaning.

2.some terms of theoretical physics, which cannot be observable.

Nicod: The question of whether a particular observation statement confirms a given hypothesis should depend only on the content of the hypothesis, not on its formulation. Hempel: The hypothesis in question is 'All ravens are black', thediscovery of any instance of an object which is not black and not a raven, such as a yellow pencil, would serve to confirm our hypothesis.

He argues that the appearence of paradoxicality derives from themistaken assumption that the universal statement 'All ravens are black' is only about ravens.

His second argument: In so far as we are attempting to the logic of confirmation, we are only concerned to analyze the relation between an hypothesis and specified body of evidence, so that in any particular case we must adopt the fiction that the piece of evidence in question is all the information we have. Brown: In planning an experiment to test an hypothesis, or deciding whether a particular body of information is relevant to the truth of some hypothesis, the scientist does not pretend that the experimental result in question is the only piece of evidence he has; rather he brings to bear every bit of evidence that he can muster inorder to draw his conclusions.

Logical calculi, like mathematical calculi, can be constructed independently of the examination of any body of knowledge or experience, but the fact that a calculus exists is not a sufficient reason for assuming that it is an appropriate tool for the analysis of any particular area of human experience.

Philosophy of science could not proceed just by collecting information about what scientists do.

In the case of earlier versions of logical empricism there is, to begin with, the empricist assumption that all scientific knowledge consists of generalization from experience.

The continuing failure of the logical empricists to reach agreement on a resolution of the paradoxes of confirmation provides an important reason for looking seriously at alternative approaches to the philosophy of science. Hempel: assumes that if an hypothesis is confirmed by a given observation statement, the addition of further observation statements cannot negate that confirmation relation.

Hempel: If an observation report confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every consequence of H.

Goodman: While ocnfirmation is indeed a relation between evidence and hypothesis, this does not mean that our definition of this relation must refer to nothing other than such evidence and hypothesis.

There is another vast range of additional information that we can legitimately take into account: information about the history of past projections and their successes and failures.

Contemporary empricists generally agrre that a central characteristic of succesful scientific theories is that it is possible to predict new phenomena on the basis of them, and to use theories which were originally proposed in oredr to account for other phenomena that were not considered in their construction.

A theory which was postulated in order to account for a specific set of phenomena and which could account for no other phenomena would not generally be considered a significant scientific achievement. Russel: But on his approcah, no theory would be extendable for every time a new kind of data were taken into account, we would have to add this data into the definitions of our terms and we would thus be redefining the theoretical concepts rather than bringing a new area ofexperience under an old concept. Bridgman: In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.

It is the empricist thesis that only terms which are defined by reference to observables have cognitive meaning that led to the attempt to define disposition terms by means of observables, and it's the empricist requirement that such definitions be formulated in the symbolism of principia logic that led to the rejection of the proposed definition and the need for further research.

Reduction sentences introduce terms only for the specified test conditions; they do not provide general definitions for this terms. Carnap: Rather than defining theoretical terms by reference to observables, theoretical terms are given a partial interpretation for a particular set of experiments and a particular set of possible outcomes of these experiments.

The terms introduced by reduction sentences are 'reduced in a certain sense' to observables.

Reduction sentences only introduce terms for a specific set of specified experimental conditions. Hempel: Reduction sentences only define the terms that they introduce for a specified set of circumstances, it remains possible to extend theterm to new circumstances by the introduction of new reduction sentences for those new circumstances. Brown: From analytic statements we can only deduce further analytic statements. Carnap: But, as he recognized, if reduction sentences are accepted as a form of definition, the general thesis that all definitions areanalytic must be given up, for any reduction pair has a definite emprical content.

For many empricists the sole function of science is to find relations between observation statements; theoretical statements function only as intermediaries in this process. Thus if a way can be found to formulate all connections between observables without having to make use of theoretical terms, theoretical terms will have been shown to be unnecessary and the problem of analyzing their emprical meaning is eliminated. Craig: What his theorem provides is a general method of eliminating a selected group of terms from a formalized system without changing the contenet of the system. In order to apply the method it is first necessary that we have an effective criterion for distinguishing the 'essential' expressions of the system from the 'auxilary' expressions. Taking the 'content' of the system to be identical with the class of essential expressions. He gives a method for constructing a new axiomatized system which includes all the essential expressions and none of the auxilaries.

The most important defect: It can only be applied to completed deductive systems.

Campbell: Viewing a scientific theory as an axiomatized formal system, a distinction is made between two parts of the formal system: the body of theoretical propositions which is formulated solely in the theoretical vocabulary, and a set of 'correspondence rules' which connect functions consructed out of the theoretical terms with observations terms.

What is important about this analysis in the context of our present concerns is that the terms appering in the theoretical propositions alone, independently of the correspondence rules, aretaken as having no emprical meaning; emprical meaning is conferred on these terms when they are connected with experience by means of thecorrespondence rules.

These terms will get their emprical meaning by virtue of their occurence in formulas in which other terms which occur in corresppondence rules also occur.

Correspondence rules are affected by emprical data and they cannotbe taken to be either analytic statements or conventional rules.

Hempel and Oppenheim: The defect in te method that they construct forusing any law to explain any event is seen by them equivqlent to eliminating the predictive force of the proposed explanation and the anomaly is resolved by restoring this predictive force.

An explanation of an particular event is not fully adequate unless its explanans could have served as a basis for predicting the event in question and conversely. Hempel: For the systematic purposes of scientific explanation, reliance on anologies is thus inessential and can always be dispensed with.

For him, models and analogies may play an important heuristic role in the process of constructing theories and a pragmatic role in helping us to understand theories, but they have no relevance to studies of the logical structure of explanation. Scriven: The scientific explanation represent a refinement on the ordinary explanation. It is the understanding which is the essential part of an explanation.

Unlike the deductive explanation, a statistical explanation does not show that given the premises, the phenomenon to be explained necessarily occurs, but only that it is highly probable. Hempel: In the application o finductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as the basis for determining the degree of confirmation. Nagel: The normal expansion of some body of theory are shown to be derivable from that theory when suitably specialized. Reichenbach: Physical theories give an account of the observational knowledge of their time; they cannot to be eternal truths. Hempel and Oppenheim: The sentences constituting the explanans must be true.

It is not sufficient that the explanans be higly confirmed. Hempel: He has given up the notion that true explanations are achievable in science and the consequent notion that science is capable of establishing the final truth of propositions. Nagel: The requirement that the premises in a satisfactory explanation muts be true seems inescapable.

But at the same time he denies that these premises must be known to be true. Current science includes a fair number of acceptable scientific explanations.

But a an acceptable scientific explanation must have true premises so that he must hold that a fair number of contemporary scientific theories are indeed true.

We do know that many currently accepted scientific explanationsare satisfactory and thus have true premises, but we do not know whichscientific claims fall into this class.

Popper: His central thesis is that there is no process of induction bywhich scientific theories are confirmed and thus no role in the philosophy of science for a theory of confirmation as understood by logical empricists.

Popper: The criterion of demarcation that Popper finds implicit in thework Of the positivists is one which might be called 'verificationosm'.

If one of these deduced observation statements is shown by experience to be false, then the universal proposition in question in question is false.

A proposition is scientific only i fit can be falsified by experience.

Pseudo-scientific theories such as astrology often make correctpredictions, but they are so formulated as to be capable of evading any falsification and are thu snot scientific.

Scientific theories must not only be emprically falsiable, but a scientific claim must be rejected as it has encountered a single falsifying instance.

If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted.

It must be agreed which observable situations mean that theory is refuted.

Science progresses as a result of scientists making bold cojectures which go beyond the available data; having made his conjectures, the scientists prime concern in testing his theories is not to attemp to prove them true, but to attemt to refute them.

The discovery of instances which are in accordence with the predictions of a theory neither confirm the theory nor confer a degree of probability on it, but they are not totally irrelavent to the evaluation of the theory; under certai circumstances they serve as corroborating instances. A theory is corroborated whenever it possibly have refuted the theory fails to refute it.

We cannot define a numerically calculable degree of corroboration, but can speak only roughlyin terms of positive degrees of corroboration, negative degrees of corroboration, and so forth. Popper: There is no final refutation of a theory.

Basic statements are accepted or rejected as a reuslt of experience, but it is logically impossible to prove or disprove any statement.

Falsification takes place only after scientists agree to accept a basic statement as adequately corroborated.

Every test of a theory must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept.

Falsification o fa theory requires the acceptance of a basic statement which cotradicts it. This condition is necessary, but not sufficient for falsification.

No actual falsification can occur until after a falsifying hypothesis has been corroborated.

Every case of falsification requires a prior corroboration and in no particular case can a falsification be any stronger or more final than a corroboration.

The judgement of the scientific community plays a much greater role than does the application of formal rule and effective criteria, and in which theory and observation are much more nearly co-equal partners in the construction of science.

The system of postulates which make up a theory 'floats' or 'hovers' freely above the plane of emprical facts, but it's the emprical facts, which are known independently of any theory, that quarantee the objectivity of science.

In response to the view that perception provides us with pure facts, it is argued that the knowledge, believes and theories we already hold play a fundamental role in determining what we perceive. Hanson: There is more to seeing than meets the eye. Duhem: An observer who lacks the relevant knowledge will not gain the same information by watching the experiment as will a trained physicist and there is thus an important respect in which the layman and the physicist see different things when they observe the same experiment.

These differences are of fundamental importance for understanding the nature of significant perception and thus for understanding the way in which perception can contribute to knowledge.

If our knowledge and believes play a central role in determining what we perceive, then the scientific theories that a scientist holds should play the same sort of role in determinig what he observes in the course of his research. Hanson: Scientific observation should be theory-laden. Kuhn: If we can succed in stripping off the identification, we make a transition from theory-laden to non-theory-laden perception, from 'seeing as' to 'seeing' and thus succeed in observing the object itself.

Concept-free seeing is not the criterion for what is really there, but rather our independent knowledge of what is really there tells us what to look for. Hanson: In every case in which I see is the case I gain information as a result of my seeing, but what information I gain depends not only on what visual events takes place in my eyes, nerves and brain, but also on what information I bring with me.

Every instance in which I gain information as a result of seeing is an instance in which I see that something is the case and the more I already know about the situation in question the more I can learn.

Observation only occurs in those cases in which we make use of our physical senses. Hanson: ~ The meaning of the observed situation that becomes a part of our knowledge and the objects of significant perception are thus meanings. Brown: Meanings are the objects of significant perception. Sense-data cannot be the primary objects of our knowledge.

In my everyday experience I continually select out as meaningful only a very small number of sensations which appear in my visual field, my auditory field, etc. and it's only to these sensations that I pay attention.

The scientist does not record everything he observes but rather only those things which the theories he accepts indicate are significant.

The important case in which a scientist identifies a phenomenon as anomalous or problematic he is clearly obserrving its meaning in terms of the theories he holds, for if he had no beliefs about what ought to occur in the situation in question, no occurance could be perceived as problematic.

Popper: Empricism requires that theories be tested by deducing from the theory consequences which can be compared with the results of observation.

Experience can motivate a decision to accept or reject a singular statement but can never prove or disprove any singular statement, and thus that all singular statements are accepted or rejected by convention. Brown: A single perceiver can see a given object in different ways and two different observers can simultaneously see the same object differently.

For scientific theories to be emprically testable, the percepts against which they are tested must be independent of the theory. A theory which creates its own data can never be refuted by this data.

If observation is theory-laden there is no adequate reason for accepting one theory rather than another. Kuhn: The theory-ladenness of perception omplies relativism is only plausible if one accepts the prior presupposition that only the observation of theory-free data can give us a reason for accepting one theory rather than another. Kuhn: Describes normal science as research done in accordance with a 'paradigm'. Brown: In normal science, an accepted fundamental theory serves to organize and structure scientific research.

Kant: Knowledge is only possible in so far as we have experience, but we must distinguish between experience and sensations.

Experience is also constituted of a combination of form and content, with sensation providing the content of experience while the mind itself provides the form. There are two ways in which the minds provides this form: via the sense of via the concepts of the understanding. There are two forms of sense: space and time.

For him, the fact that the objects we experience are found in space and time is a fact about the structure of the human mind and nota fact about the mind-independent structure of reality.

We cannot know a priori what the particular cause of any given event is, this part of the content of experience and must be discovered by emprical research.

'Every event has a cause', and it is this proposition that we will consider further in oreder to illustrate the role of presuppositions in scientific research.

For him, the task of the scientist is to find the causes of events and a scientific problem is solved only when a cause for the event in question has been found. If scientists are unable to find the cause of an event, it is always the scientists and not the principle of causality that is at fault. Collingwood: For him, as for Kant, all knowing requires presuppositions, but they change throughout the course of human history.

His basic thesis is that every meaningful propositions is the answer to some question and we can only understand the meaning of a proposition if we know what question it is intended to answer.

Because questions have presuppositions which generate them, it is always possible to take one of two attitudes toward a question: we can answer it, or we can reject the presupposition and thereby reject the question.

The presuppositions those which are propositions and themselves answers to questions, are all relative presuppositions. But at the root of each sequence of questions and answers, there is an absolute presupposition which is not the answer to any questio, which is not therefore, a proposition, and which is neither true nor false. Rather an absolute presupposition is something like a methodological principle to be judged by what he calls its 'logical efficacy'. Thus absolute presuppositions are the foundation of all intellectual activity: but unlike Kant, for him what absolute presuppositions are hekd are the charecteristic of a given era and charge in the course of history although he gives no analysis of how change takes place beyond saying that absolute presuppositions develop 'strains' which lead to their collapse.

Each era in the history of science has been charecterized by somefundamental conception of what nature is.

His thesis that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false and that they are taken to be neither true nor false by by those who propound them is most doubtful.

It is not clear whether each discipline has its own absolute presuppositions or whether they are charecteristic of all thought in an era, nor even whether the answer to this question may not be different with respect to different eras in the history of thought. Brown: Perhaps the most striking feature of presuppositions is that they do not fit into the customary dichotomy between analytic and emprical propositions.

A working scientist who seeks the cause of some phenomenon does not have the option of deciding that he is not dealing with an event and thus eliminating his problem when he finds that he can discover no cause.

When a scientist has difficulty finding phenomena that his presuppositions tell him must be present he will often carry out emprical research to seek this phenomena. This suggests two more arguments against the thesis that presuppositions can be expressed in analytic propositions. First, one of the central charecteristics of an analytic proposition is that no counter-instance is logically possible. Second, a research project is often neede to eliminate a scientific scandal and show that the accepted presupposition is justified. Although presuppositions rae protected propositions which are not given up lightly at the first sig of a counter-instance, presuppositions do change and a presistent failure to account for an anomaly might well lead to changes. Therefore it is often necessary to carry out emprical research in order to defend a presupposition, but such research is never necessary for the defense of an analytic proposition.

Many of scientific propositions have been taken tp be necessary, eternal a priori truths, but some of them nonetheless been abondened, it should by now be clear that every scientific proposition is subject to possible revision.

From the point of view of logic alone, a counter-instance only tells us that there is something wrong in the accepted structure, it tells us nothing about where the problem lies. Duhem and Quine: We never test an isolated scientific proposition, but only the entire body of science

Even though there are no a priori propositions in science, not all propositions are treated as testable emprical hypothesis. It is only because a large body of knowledge is taken as paradigmic that we canisolate individual propositions for purposes of testing, and what conclusions we draw from a particular test depends on what propositionsare taken as paradigmic.

A scientist who does research within the framework of an accepted theory has to learn hi strade, this involves more than learning a set of paradigmic propositions, and the trained scientist knows a good deal more than he could state as a set of propositions.

The information can only be passed on to the learner by taking himthrough a course of problem solving which will lead him to discover the necessary techniques for himself.

The student is being initiated into a normal tradition: he is learning how a particular style of science is done, how one solves physical problems, and eventually, what the unsolved problems are.

Whenever the structure of the phycical world fail to mesh, anomalies will appear and although many anomalous event may eventualy be interpreted in terms of an accepted theory, it is the recalcitrant anomalies that eventually lead to the overthrow of one theory and its replacement by another, i.e. to scientific revolutions.

Copernicus' attemp to deal with an astronomical problem had theeffect of undermining the foundation of the accepted physics so that the new astronomy required to construction of a new physics.

The thesis that meaning of scientific concepts changes as a resultof a scientific revolution has been regarded by many logical empricists. Israel Scheffler: No significant conceptual change takes place unless the extension of the concept has changed. Brown: Besides concepts with change in the course of a scientific revolution, there are others which are dropped altogether. Hempel: The concepts of science are the knots in a network of systematic interrelationships in which the laws and theoretical principles form the threads.

The meaning of theoretical terms cannot be completely specified byreference to an antecedently available vocabulary, but he concludes from this that the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms 'does not exist'.

A scientific concept is a knot ina web; the strands in the web are the propositions that make up the theory; the meaning of a concept is its location in the web. Thus the meaning of a concept is determined by the strands that come into this knot, by the other knots the one in question is connected to, and by further connections of these other knots.

A concept is not a simple which is grasped entirely or not at all, but rather a complex which can be learned a bit at a time. Brown: Just as tehere can be no significant observation without theories, so there can be no scientific theory that is not used to organize some area of experience.

Concepts, propositions and observations are the elements from which scientific theories are built. It is impoosible to introduce any of these elements without introducing the other two, and impossible to begin learning one of these aspects of a theory without beginning to learn the others.

Relativity theory is a generalization of Newtonian theory are based on the formal and quantitative relations between the two theories, not on their historical relation, and on formal and quantitative grounds there is no reason for maintaining that relativity theory is a generalization of Newtonian theory any more than of Mewtonian or Pewtonian theory. None of this is to be taken as denying the obvious fact that relativity theory grew out of Newtonian theory, not out of its successes, and the process which yielded the new physics was not a process of generalization, but rather a process of adopting new presuppositions about the structure of physical reality and transforming the basic concepts with which scientists think about and deal with the physical world.

The notion of a scientific revolution is a philosophical, not a scientific, notion. Just as scientists make use of data supplied by observation and experiment in constructing their theories, so the philosopher of science makes use of the data supplied by the history of science.

A philosophy of science is a theory of the same general kind as a scientific theory.

The philosopher is concerned only with logical questions and that such questions arise only after a scientific theory has been formulated; the process by which a scientist happens to think up a particular theory is of no concern to the logician or philosopher, even though it may be of conciderable interest to the psycologist or sociologist. Reichenbach: A sharp line can be drawn between the discovery and the testing of scientific theories; and that is only with respect to the testing of theories that we can speak of a logic at all, for logic has nothing to say about discovery. Brown: The context of justification is thus part of the context of discovery and no sharp line can be drawn between discovery and justification.

Two parts of the discovery process:

1.logical part (justification)

2.creative part (non-logical)

Popper:There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. Every discovery contains an 'irrational' or a 'creative' part. Plato: Dialectical logic applies to atte[ts to answer a question, but questions only arise in the context of presuppositions. In the context of a particular set of presuppositions many answers to a question are possible, teher is no effective procedure for determinig which answer ought to be put forth at a given point, although the detailed structure of the argument will often be highly suggestive, and many self-consistent proposals will be ruled out by the presuppositions. Brown: Dialectical logic does not deal with the relations between isolated or relatively isolated propositios, but with the role of propositions and questions in so far as they are parts of structured systems of presuppositions and problems. It does not provide a set of formal rules for analyzing the relationships between statements, as does deductive logic. It is a content logic, not a formal one.

What the concept of a dialectical logic provides is a tool for examining the structure of research in terms of the historical context.

A deductive logic offers only an instrument for the rational recvonstruction of completed research programs. The concept of dialectic can provide an instrument for analyzing both the relations between successive theories and the actual research process because it is concerned with analyzin scientific thought in terms of the intellectual tools used by the scientist.

The study of scientific discovery examines scientific research from the point of view of the practicing researcher; the study of scientific development looks back over the history of science and examines the relations between successive theories.

Scientists sought to use the accepted theory in an area to which it ought to apply and found a conflict between theory and observation. Again the response was to offer an hypothesis, one completely in accord with the accepted theory.

While in some cases a fundamental discovery involves a wholly new hypothesis is by no means a necessary feature of a scientific revolution. Poincare: Absolute space , absolute time, even Euclidian geometry, are not conditions to be imposed on mechanics; one can express the facts connecting them in terms of non-Euclidian space.

No one has seriously maintained that new theories are deduced from old ones, and the view that new theories are generalizations of old theories willnot stand up.

A dialectical change from one theory to another is a reorganization of the strands of the theoretical web, along with the removal of some strands and the addition of others; this reorganizationaccounts for the changes in the menaing of scientific concepts and observations associated with a scientific revolution, since both the concepts and the data of a theory derive their meaning from their location in the theoretical web. But theory change takes place within definite problem situations.

The thesis that if we are to have a rational basis for choosing between rival theories at a perticular moment in the history of science, we must have some standart to appeal to which is accepted by proponenets of both theories, and the thesis that if scientific change is to be rationalthere must be some eternal standart against which we can compare any theories.

The appeal to observations and to emprical laws cannot be made independently of theory.

The choice between scientific theories does not takes place by appeal to eternal standarts, established by philosophers, but rather by appeal to scientific standarts which are provided by the theories involved.

It being assumed that beliefs can be either true or false while knowledge can only be true.

There is no clear, simple relation between the results of experiment or observation and scientific theories. Aristotle: Science is deductive demonstration of necessary truths from premises which are themselves both necessarily true and knowmn to be true. Brown: His proposal is to take man of practical wisdom as a model of the maker of crucial scientific decisions which cannot be made by appeal to an algorithm, and he offes the making of these decisions as a model of rational thougth. It is the trained scientist who must make these decisions, and it is the scientists, not the rules they wield, that provide the locus of scientific rationality.

It is the ability to decide how an exceptional case should be handled that is charecteristic of rationality.

The results of logic and experiment must themselves be evaluated. It is the task of the skilled scientist to carry out this evaluation, and such evaluations furnish paradigm cases of rationality.

Rather than declare the process of scientific discovery ot be irrational, we should consider the scientist actively seeking the solution of a problem as providing another paradigm case of rational thought.

A theory arived at rationally is not sufficient to make it a part of the body of science; that requires not an individual but a group decision. No thesis becomes a part of the body of scientific knowledge unless it has been put before and accepted by the community of scientists who make up the relevant discipline. Kuhn: It is the consensus of the workers in a discipline that determines what constitutes knowledge in this discipline, but the group may later discover that it made a mistake. The group is no more infallible than the individual. Brown: The model of the man of pracytical wisdom applies to group as well as to individual decisions: these are judgements made on the basis of information and experience, but without the benefit of necessary truths or algorithmic procedures which can quarantee a decision immune from being overtuned by a future research.

The scientific community has been notebly self-correcting.

Scientific knowledge at any period consists of a number of elements: the fundamental theories which guide research, and with them the body of laws, fundamental constants, and observations that are of particular significance in the light of the guiding theory.

Scientific knowledge in any era is what the scientists actively take as such, and the scientific knowledge of one era may be rejected as error in the next. but the rejection of previously accepted claims will itself be made on the basis of the currently accepted views, which are themselves falible.

Unless scientists have an effective method for determinig once and for all which propositions are true, we cannot datermine which part of currently accepted science is indeed knowledge, nor even whether there exists any scientific knowledge at all.

We free ourselves from the belief that science can establish final truths, and accept instead that the best that science can hope to attain is tentative rational consensus on the basis of available evidence.

Truth1: 'Absolute' or 'ultimate' sense of the term, in hwich that a theory is true to assert that it gives a correct description of an aspect of reality. Dentes the goal for which scientists strive in constructing theories, but it has no relevance for the evaluation of theories since theories provide the only access we have to reality.

Truth2: Whatever is known must be true. Any proposition which is a part of the body of scientific knowledge is a true2 proposition.

A proposition is false1 if and only if it does not provide an adequate desciption of reality; it is false2 then when it is rejected by the current consensus.

Scientists are trying to understand a reality which is objective in the sense that it exists independently of their theories.

A consensus can be influenced or even forced by social, economic or political factors, e.g. the dominance of a particular ondividual or school, the availability of funds for a particular kind of research, or the prohibition of some kinds of research by a government or a powerful religious organization.

It would seem impossible to distinguish a ligitimately established consensus from an illegitimate one.


The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Karl Popper)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery ( Karl Popper , 1959 )

( Logik der Forschung , 1934 )

Book review and criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU

Popper believes that philosophy is a must activity; because we all aasumes lots of things things as data, and most of these assumptions are philosophical.

Popper is undeterminist both in physics and in politics. He claims that it is logically improbable to predict the flow of history in the future.

It is argued for a long time that the basic duty of science is to search for the natural laws.

First systematic works in this subject have been performed by Francis Bacon.

Scientist, at a point on the border of our knowledge and unknowledge, begins with experiments which aims to make carefully controlled and measured observations. He edits his findings. With these editions and time, that scientist and the others working on the same area cumulates lots of knowledge which are shared and trusted. General charecteristics begins to appear with growing of these cumulative knowledge. Then individuals begins to claim general presuppositions (these are law-like propositons which fit all known events and explain the causal relations between them. A scientist tries to justify his proposition by finding evidences which will support them. If his justification becomes succesful, this means that he found a new scientific law which will explain much more secrets of nature. Then, this investigation is applied to everywhere in where it is assumed that it can generate new knowledge. Thus, new ones are added to existent scientific knowledge set, hence border of our knowledgelessness is pushed back.

This method of lasting general propositions to cumulative observations of original cases is called as 'induction', and this is the distinguishing property of science. Usage of induction method is assumed the demarcation between science and non-science.

Growing of science happens in duration of adding new realities tothe existent ones. Hume: pointed out that singular observations, whatever their amount is, logically, could not reach unconditional general propositions.

Understanding of currency of physical laws in the past does not mean, logically, that they will be current in the future.

All of our science assumes the regularity of nature (it is assumed that in the view of all cases where natural laws works, future will be just like the past), but there is no way to justify this proposition. It can not be proved by observation, because future events cannot be observed. It cannot be proved logically, too, because the result that 'all futures in future will seem like pasts in future' cannot be derived from the cause 'all futures in the past seemed like pasts in the past'.

There is no way to prove the currency of inductive durations. But our psylogical structure is organized such that we cannot think without them. Russel: Hume showed that pure experimentalism is not a sufficient ground for science. Hume: Induction is a logical basic which is independent of experiment and other logical basics, and science is impossible without this basic....

It must be accepted that scientific laws cannot be justified, therefore they are not certain. In spite of this every justifyable sample increases their degree of probability; addition to all the past known, every instance of the continuity of the world provides billions of justifyable samples, but don't bring any counter-sample. Therefore, even though they are not certain, they are probable at the highest thinkable level, and maybe not in theory, but in practice it is not possible to distinguish them from certainty. Popper: He points out the asymmetry between justification and falsification.

Experimental generalizations cannot be justified, but can be falsified. This means that eventhough scientific laws are justifyable, but they are testable.

In logic, a scientific law cannot certainly be justified, but theycan certainly be falsified. In methodology, it always is possible tosuspect from any propopsition. Therefore, for us, without falling into any contradiction with ourselves, it always is possible to reject the currency of any experimental proposition. Hence, we can reject all falsificative experiments.

He proposes as a methodological basic that, we should avoid from denying (using ad hoc assumptions or definitions or another systematic way) the currency of experimental results which seem unconvinient for us; according to this, for making our theories be open for falsification, we should formulate them far from multi-meaningness. At the same time, he advises that we should not abondon our theories, because then this will be a situation which is far from criticism against tests.

In these conditions, in logic, he can be called as a naive falsificatist, but in methodology, he is a very critical falsificatist.

Whether our theory is true, nor it is false it says more things about world than we know until that time.

If some of the things which our theory says, this becomes a new investigation: it increases our knowledge and makes our search for better theory re-start.

Improvement of our knowledge occurs by our meeting with new problems and trying to solve them.

Nothing in science is continuously justified and permanent, and it is clear that science continuously is changing, but this occurs by addition of new certainties to science.

We last our decisions and expectations to 'what and ho much we know', and we temporarily assume the truthness of that knowledge for practical purposes; because it is the laest untrustable basic; but we don't forget that, at any time, experiment might show its falseness and we will have to change it.

All measurements of both space and time can be certain only at some level.

Our purpose in searching knowledge is to approach to true more and more, even we can know that we are going forward in this way, but we certainly cannot know whether we reach our target or not. We cannot accept science as synonym with true; because we accept theories of both Newton and Einstein as science; both cannot be true, moreover both can be false.

The work of understanding the world has no rules.

He says that the induction method is an abondonable concept. It is a myth. There is nothing which is called as induction. Any different thought, which is more true, can be substituted its place.

How a theory is reached has no scientific and logical meaning. Therefore no way is illegal. This is not a logical, but a psylogical duration.

All the problem of induction is because that we cannot distinguish between logical and psylogical durations.

A logic of 'creativeness' in science is as impossible as that in art. Einstein: Supports the ideas of Popper.

There is no logical way to investigate laws of the natura.

Theory can not be made of observational results, but be investigated. Popper: Observation cannot directly be before theory, because there must exist a bit of theory in each observation.

It is meaningless the belief that, without anything, we can begin with pure observation.

Observation is always selective. It requires a selected object, a certain work, an interest, a point of view, a question. Description of it requires the existence of a language which has descriptive property words, the existence of similarities and grouping; these themselves requires again interest, point of views and problems. This means that observations, especially the propositions of observations and experiments, always are the interpretations of observed concepts; these are interpretations in the light of theories.

Our knowledge can only be exist by means of our theories.

Concepts of our thinking are not given by objective regularities, but thay are (created and) improved in response to our problems, interests and point of views.

Understanding of concepts ('what' questions about them) takes us to meaningless loops and verbalism. Moreover, this explanation process may cause the creation of new concepts which even must be explained. Therefore we should not try to lighten the concepts before testing theories.

If how much a proposition gives knowledge, the ways in which its falseness can be shown increases that much.

What we want is the propositions whose knowledge content is high, hence its probability is law, but reaches to truth more. Being falsifyable in a high degree makes them testable at a high degree, too. Popper: Our knowledgelessness increases with our knowledge, so we always will have more questions than our answers.

A theory should bring an answer to our problems. At the same time it should be in accordance with all known observations, and contain the theories before it as approximate solutions; in addition to this it must explain the reasons of their unsuccessfullness.

At a certain time, the theory between the competing theories whichgives the best results is the one which is supported with its contentwhich can give knowledge at the highest level; therefore it should be the sovereign one.

For lots of purposes, a proposition which is a bit false is more usefull than a true, but undetermined one.

We should formulate our theories as certain as possible.

The distinguishing factor between science and non-science is 'falsifyableness'.

Historically, foundations of all the theories can be found in myths, and a myth can contain some elements which informs scientific theories. Therefore if it is understood that a theory is unscientific or metaphysical, just because of this it cannot be said that it is meaningless or nonsensical.

These ideas are just the opposites those of logical positivists.

An idea which is accepted as metaphysical (because it is not testable) at a time, later may be testable by changing of the conditions, therefore becomes scientific.

A metaphysical theory even can be true.

Language is an instrument, and what is important is what is done with it (not the way in which the words are used).

The main problem of philosophy (maybe the question in which all humen are intersted in): understanding of the world (ourselves and our knowledge as an element of it).


Evolutionism

Popper: Theory of innate ideas is meaningless. But each organism has innate reactions and responses. Thses can be called as 'expectations' (unconscious).

Because of the close relations between knowledge and interset, in a rational level, we can talk about 'innate knowledge'. But this knowledge is not effective as a priori.

We birth with expectations, these are not a priori philosophically, but psycologically and genetically, and these are knowledges that comes before every kind of observational experiment.

Elimination of falses occur in a natural-selection way.

Language made improvement of mind (reflection) be possible. It is the basic element of consciousness.

Religion, myth, useless beliefs, language, these are human-made. But these are created without planning. Maybe there were no need for them until they created.

World1: A world of material things which are objective.

World2: A world of ideas which is subjective.

World3: A world of material things which are created by minds or living things (they exists free from their creators after creation), which are objective.

We are social creatures. Nobody is free of the past (history)effects of other people.

We progress by criticising conventions and by making changes on it.

We don't know where and how to begin to understand tha world. Even science and convention cannot say this to us . They can only say whereand how the others begin.

If a theory is scientific, and it is carefully tested by its proposer, scientific world does not accept this before its experiments and observations are repaeted by other people.

Knowledge are not in the special mind situations of individuals, but it is in social area.

From the special individual point of view, most of human knowledge does not be known by anybody. It is only on paper.

Nobody can repeat (word by word) his own writings (i.e. a writer of a book).

What we know is that we can know.

Knowledge is free of its knower.

In objective meaning, knowledge is knowledge which has no knower, which has no knowing subject.

Scientific knowledge is not the knowledge in the ordinary usage ofthe sentence 'I know'.

One Dimensional Man (Herbert Marcuse)

Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet ) )
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One Dimensional Man ( by Herbert Marcuse , 1964 )

Book review and criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU


Great changes can be performed only if one lives in the needs of changing ways of life

and rejecting conventional ones.

Technological rationality became political rationality.

In high-industry society, what soverigh is an easy, smooth, rational and democratic unfreeness. What may be rational than compression of individualism by making works, which are necessary (as social) but painful, with machines.

Today, political power shows itself via its power on mechanical duration and on instrument's practical organization. Goverment of developed or developing industrial society can keep its continuation when it becomes succesful in running, organizing and using the practical, scientific and mechanismic productivity which is hold by high industrial civilization.

By using the secret power of advertisements, people are getting believed that they have lots of needs -in fact which are not real needs-; in this way people begins to rest, enjoy, behave, use up in convenience with advertisements, they love, hate whom somebodies else love, hate... These are wrong. The needs which have infinite rights to be supplied are the vital ones.

The main problem is that most of the individual are unaware of their slaveness.

The distinguishing factor of highly-industrialized societies is that it chokes the needs which require freeness in an effective way, but at the same time it makes terminating power and compressive work of comfort-society.

Reachableness of alternatives open to individual is not effective in measuring the degree of human liberty.

To be able to choose masters freely does not cancel masters and slaves. Being able to choose freely between a alrge variety of properties and services does not show liberty; if these properties and services supports the social controls over a life of difficulties and fears. Reproduction of needs which are forced to be believed by superiorities, by individual does not constitute the autonomy.

Pre-conditioning begins with social productions of radio and television, and centralization of controls.

People know himself in materials they bought.

Concept is synonym with set of reciprocal operations.

One-dimensional thought is developed systematically by politic-applicators and their social-informatic sellers.

Progress is not an objective term; it goes towards some aims, and these aims are defined by probabilities of making human conditions better.


Stopping of Social Changes

What high-technology promises is a more comfortable life for more people than ever. Machinized working, as a life-long business, makes individuals be slaves which are used up, foolihs, out of humanity.

High-tech brought technological stresss and reflective struggling instead of muscular tiredness. Machines seems like giving a certain ritm of insensibleness to its operators.

Profession autonomy of workers become his professional slaveness.

Accorrding to Marx, machines never creates values, but transer their values to the products; plus-value is generated by exploison of vital labour.

Maneging of running's preference of engineers and university graduates decreases the possibilities of raising.

Today's pressures of weaponization which are technologic at a very high-level,took from goverment officers the priority and power of making important decisions, and gave it to applicators, planners and scientists which were used by wide industrial empires, and were given high responsibilities for the benefits of their employees.


What Limitations Can Bring

Capitalism will keep its continuation of ability to increase the life-standarts for an increasing part of society.

A society, to become an independent one, at first, should create the materialist pre-requisites of independence; first it should create richness such that it can distribute it as appropriate for the freely improving needs of individuals; first it should make its slaves be capable laern, see and think such that they can know that what is going and what they can do to be able to change this.

The transition from 'giving according to working' to 'giving according to needs' should be performed.

Distribution of needs without looking at productivity, reducing of working hours to minimum limits, universal multi-dimensional education; these are the pre-requisites of self-autonomy. For now, creation of these pre-equisites only can occur by insistence of gowerment, but commonness and adoptance of these wiil bring the end of goverment.

It is impossible that underdeveloping countries easily can perform the historical jump from pre-technological society to post-technological society, and then the technological instrument canprovide a base for a real democracy.


Comfort-State and War-State

Comfort-state systematically decreases and compresses (consciously or inconsciously) a. practically useable free time, b. quantity and quality of practically useable goods and services for vital needs, c. rationality which have the ability of getting probabilities of self-determination and making them conceptual.

So it is a state of freenessless.

To be effective, exhausting in a creazy way and this kind of production, these socially should be rational.

If the life governed is confortable, even good, then there is no need to insist on self-determination.

For a governed individual, governing by laws is infinitely confidental than governing by artificial-laws or govrerning without laws.

In this civilization the creasiest calculations can be make rational: termination of five million of people can be preferred to termination of twenty million. For now, it seems it is a dummy job to expect these will bring self-end of this civilization, while it can be able to make itself be clear.

Democracy is the most effective pressive controlling system.

Knowledgelessness and inconsciousness is so much that nationalism can keep its improvement.

People are cheated by nation and communities. They feel pains of this. But here their enemy is the masters who uses the mystical effects of technology and power.

Although poeple know that advertisements or political platforms may not be true or right, they listen to them, read them, and let theirselves be controlled and directed by them. As this, they accept the conventional values and add them to their rational values.

Music of soul is the same time the music of the seller.

Realities of literature and art have always been accepted as it had belonged to a 'high' order; and this high order must have not disturbed the capitalist order, in fact it have not disturbed.

At high levels art is a great rejection.

High-industrialized civilization runs with a high level sexual independence -sexual independence has a market value and it is an element of social rules. The body is allowed to show its sexual charecteristics without stopping its being an instrument of labour.

Operationalism, gaining artic charecteristics, supports and fastens this tendency.

Sexuality combined with working and social relations, thus it became more open to controlled satisfaction.

A satisfaction which creates a unconditional acceptance and weakens the rationality of rejection.

Capacity of society about adjusting practical improvement increases its capacity of adjusting and controlling (satisfying it in a productive way) the capacity of termination.


Playing the Game

To understand the game it should be played, because understanding is in 'experience'.

There is no place for feelings of crime.

Who makes theirselves be united (dual) with the society and accepts theirselves as the leadres and defenders of the unity, can make mistakes, but they don't make faults; they never are quilty.


Language of the Unitic Goverment

Defense laboratories, managing offices, govermenets and machines, time-controllers and operators, professionals of effection and political beauty saloons uses a different language than people do, and for now it seems that they have the right to say the last words. This is a language which orders, organizes and directs people to do, buy and accept.

Calling of party which works for defending and growing of capitalism, as social, and of a despotic goverment as democratic, and of a adjusted election as independent is the results of this kind kind of language.

Personalization is one of the instruments of this language.Usages like 'your deputy, your roads, your favourite store, your newspaper' are directly brought to you, and calling you. These have magical effects.

Abbreviations are another tricks. They changes the direction of your attention, i.e NATO is more symphatic (and far from its originalimpressed meaning) than North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This prevents direct and conceptual thinking; thus thinking. Because concept cannot find its operation.


Unitic Goverment's Searching

Society which plans and performs the technological transformation of nature changes step by step from individual dependence to dependence on objective order of things (economical rules, market etc.).

Now sovereignity creates a high level of rationality.

Termination is the cost of progress.

Real knowledge and mind have the desire to soverignity on the senses.

Natural sciences developes under the technological a priori that designs the nature as a secret instrument of controlling and organization.

Technological a priori is a political a priori.

But machines of technological world, as machines, are not interested in political aims. Observation and experiment, organization of data, proposal and results never progressed in an unorganized, objective, theoric emptiness.

Today sovereignity continues and improve its existance not only via technology, but as technology. And technology provides the great clearness of widened political powers.

Science, via its self-methods and concepts, designed and improved such an universe that soverignity on nature depended sovereignity in it. This relation is in a fatal tendency for the universe. Duration of technological rationality is a political duration.

They are beliving that they are dying for communities, for party leaders, for motherland, for independence of individuals, for distribution of profits, for proleteria, for its bureucracy. They believe that they are dying with the orders of a state, dying for the money which supports the state. They believe that they are dying for a nation, for brigents which is against it. They believe, but why is it beleived such a darkness ? Believe - die ? -while the important thing is to learn to live.

In fact, discourse is not a combination of its contituent words, but it is just the contrary, words are generated from the entireness of the discourse.

Better products (i.e automobiles) can be generated with less cost. But some others must live. Exaltation of natural is a part of the ideology which defends an unnatural society in its struggling against freedom. It is natural that black are low-level in some places, it is normal that dogs bit the ones at back, it is natural that professions' world should exist. It is natural that big fishes swallow little ones -even if it is not natural for little ones.

To hide, don't wait to be hunted.