Tansu KUCUKONCU , PhD
( Tansu KÜÇÜKÖNCÜ ( in Turkish alphabet) )
------------------------------
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
( editors Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave , 1970)
Book criticism by Tansu KUCUKONCU
'Logic of Investigation ? or Psychology of Research ?'
by Thomas Samuel Kuhn
* Experiments can never be the last element which makes the decision
certain. Problem solving is more accurate and basic.
** Experiments sometimes may be more powerful than problem solving.
* Unless having a common paradigm no problem solving action can occur.
** Every decision action requires a reference.
* Any theory can never be disprooved.
** It's O.K. if at the same time we accept that it can never be
proved, either.
* Psychology of research is more active than logic of investigation.
** O.K. But difference is not much everytime.
* Increasing in knowledge does not mean progress; because it brings
the result of incresing in unknowns.
** Unless these new unknowns are not unsolvable, while increasing
knowledge can provide solution methods then this may be assumed as
progress.
* When making selection between alternative theories, logic alone is
not enough.
** Sometimes it may be true, but not everytime.
'Against Ordinary Science'
by John W. N. Watkins
* Histroy of science has examples that an emprically succesful valid
theory can change place with an uncompromising and more testable.
**
* Most of the time the cause of a scientific crisis is theoric rather
than empiric. This shows that science has independent thoughts more than
Kuhn states.
**
* A new paradigm is never created as Kuhn characterized. Psycological
basics of solution by a genious via dreaming seems weak.
** True.
* He states that it will be more convinient to break the relations
between Kuhn's thesis of uncomprimisation between paradigms, and the
idea of uncompareability which is away from that.
** Not a bad idea !
'Is the Difference Between Normal and Revolutionary Science Valid ?'
* There can not be a discrete jumping between matural science and
revolutions, as Kuhn stated.
** O.K.
* Psychology and sociology of research ( source of knowledge ) have
effects in science but to leave the effect of logic of of investigation
in the background is not true.
** O.K.
'Ordinary Science, Scientific Revolutions and History of Science'
by L. Pearce Williams
* Popper and Kuhn supports their ideas from the examples from history.
But we don't have enogh knowledge about history of science, which will
allow a philosophical structure to be built on a base.
** Not wrong !
'Ordinary Science and its Dangers'
by Karl Raimund Popper
* He is not relativist; he believes in absolute and objective truth.
** Are there something like these ?
* Logic of investigation has a few things to learn from psychology of
research, but psycholgy of research has more things.
** Not true !
* Knowledge has no subject.
** Can knowledge exist without a subject which knows it ?
* He states that he was surprised and frustrated with the idea that
psychology and sociology should be used to have clear thoughts.
** He thinks wrong.
* Comparison of different frames in science is always possible.
** O.K.
* Changes of frames are performed in a rational way.
** It may be true most of the time.
* Frames can be changed ( or braked or enlarged ) anytime if it is
tried.
** O.K.
* It's only a dangerous dogma that different frames are untranslate-
able languages.
** It's dogma. Why Kuhn limits the communication problem with wide
scientific frames ? It can be induced up to personal base.
* Science is criticisive; it formed by courageus hypothesis' which
are controlled by criticism. Hence it can be qualified as revolutionary.
** It can be assumed true.
* Science needs a bit of dogmatism, too. It's needed for protection
of science.
** O.K.
* He thinks there are lots of degrees between ordinary and extra-
ordinary scientists.
** O.K.
* The distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary science is not
so much definite as Kuhn stated.
** O.K.
'Falsification and Methodolgy of Scientific Research Programs'
by Imre Lakatos
* Direction of science is determined by imagination not by concepts
which surrounds us.
** Partially true.
* He defends the idea that science is continuous.
** O.K.
* Active observations can disproof theories.
** Why not ?
* He accepts that knowledge has no subject.
** ?
* Criticism is a long duration. It is not easy to eliminate a scien-
tific program with logical or emprical derivations.
** My criteria is workability. Which one seems work better it is
choosen.
* All theories are improbable as much as they are unproveable and as
muc as they are disproveable.
** O.K.
* Certainly accepted scientific theories can not prevent an obser-
vable situation, completely.
** O.K.
* Dogmatism is necessary for protection of current science.
** O.K.
* History of science is the history of competing research programs,
not of those that are serials of ordinary science.
** O.K.
* Some of the most important research programs in histiry of science
are infected to some old programs which are opposite.
** Why not ?
* If a research program causes a progressive problem change then its
successful otherwise it causes a degenerative problem change than it's
unsuccesful. He advises to abondan degenerative problem-shifts since
they are unscientific.
** It seems there are problems in the definition of progressive and
degenerative problem changes. Also in the questions 'what is scientific
and what is not ?'.
* Empricalness and theoretical progress are strictly dependent.
** O.K.
* Falsification is impossible before a better theory exists.
** If falsification is accepted then it can be performed even in the
absence of a better theory.
'Consolations for Supporters of Specialization'
by Paul Feyerabend
* We should keep in mind the truth that science is not the only des-
tination; a world in which science is inactive can be built up.
** To live like animals or plant... It seems impossible as human-
being has mind.
* No theory can be disproved.
** It may be assumed as true.
* What is scientific progress is still unanswered.
** O.K.
* A theory can be disproved by an experiment which is commented in
its terms.
** If the result works why not ?
* He accepts uncompareability of theories.
** I don't agree with him.
* Experiment is a basic part of science but not its primary comment
source.
** Sometimes it may be.
* His definition of science has two components: normal and philo-
sophical. They influences each other. They are synchronous.
** They are inapartable.
* Science is not a serial of temporary ordinary, and increasing pe-
riods, but togetherness of both.
** O.K.
* Incresing: tolerance even against the most silly ideas.
Resistance: Protection against loosing what is in hand, easily.
Influence between them provides progress.
** O.K.
* Popular ideas, eventhough they seems right and perfect, should
allow new thoughts to be created.
** O.K.
'Answers to my Criticisers'
by Thomas Samuel Kuhn
* He states that he prefers the term disciplinary matrix instead
of the term paradigm.
**
* We can not state in confident that two person sees the same
substance.
** O.K.
* When the examples formed by the scientific theory, and the
examples surrounded by the common values which are accepted to make
science are given, person, in the case that something is wrong or in
conflict, does not require any criterion to take a decision.
** Because s/he has eveything to use in decision.
* Different paradigms can not be translated into each other and be
compared.
** I don't agree with him.
* Nobody can begin a discussion about selection of theories, with an
evidence like those in logic or like those in formal mathematics.
** If we deny any proof and disproof at the beginning, in fact we
don't need any evidence.
* Scientific truth is relative.
** O.K.
* He supports specialization in science.
** O.K.
* If revolutions exist than normality should exist.
** But it is not necessary that they are completely apart.
